The article explores the accident report that, while heavily redacted, points to officers and instructors having had prior knowledge of avalanche conditions that wasn’t properly acted upon.
VTDigger explains that a non-commissioned officer—whose name was redacted—mentioned the potentially heightened avalanche risk on that day before the slide occurred.
“He told a student on the drive up that these were some of the most classic avalanche conditions he had ever seen and [to] expect to see a slide,” VTDigger notes of the official interview summary. The summary continues, “He reported that despite observations that supported an avalanche risk, they continued up the mountain by either rationalizing what they were seeing or not taking the time to process it.”
The officer in charge of training for the day was certified by the American Institute for Avalanche Research and Education, and this person has taken responsibility for the incident. “[Sargent First Class] shared his belief that the decision to be training in Easy Gully was his job and his responsibility and this accident fully rested on his shoulders,” VTDigger notes of the interview summary.
In addition to the day’s observations, there had been a previous avalanche incident in the Smugglers’ Notch area days prior, an event indicative of snow instability during the time period in question.
Based on the incident report, VTDigger has identified the failure to acknowledge avalanche risk in the official course risk assessment. This could be a result of the inadequacy of the deliberate risk assessment worksheets as they pertain to the Advanced Military Mountaineer Course and the Basic Military Mountaineer Course.
“The AMWS was in the process of making improvements to its RM [risk management] procedures when the accident occurred,” VTDigger reports of the interview summary.
And, the article points out, there wasn’t a morning meeting where the day’s risks would have been discussed, due to the late arrival of Basic Military Mountaineer Course personnel, which meant no further discussion about potential weaknesses in the snowpack.
Despite information that none of the squad members injured in the slide were carrying the proper avalanche safety tools, including a beacon, shovel and probe, the Army believes this incident was within the educational boundaries of the training.
“Each of the cadre knew their responsibilities during the rescue and performed their duties,” VTDigger reports of the official interview.
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Read the whole analysis at vtdigger.com
Wow none had the “Big 3!?” How much does an AR cost?
Less than a shovel beacon and probe, depending on the weapon and optics. :/
I’m truly baffled by the absence of avy safety tools…especially during a mountain instructional setting. Is it possible that the army uses some other device that doubles as a beacon? Other tools that are potential probes and shovels? I doubt the photo is from the event, but if it is, those packs would certainly be able to handle the extra gear.
“Leave no man behind”.